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There is a social process by which what have been virtues in one
social context can become vices in another.
Alasdair MacIntyre l
I. The Temptation of Technology

Advances in technology challenge traditional values because they invite
action. This is especially the case with contemporary medical technology,
where the allure of its promises makes difficult limiting its applications. A
paradigm example is provided by intensive care units (ICUs) in cases
where further treatment can often postpone death only marginally. Given
the prima facie obligation to preserve life, such treatment often appears
obligatory, despite the high monetary and psycho-social costs and the
meager benefits offered to particular groups of patients.2 However,
increasing health care costs and expanding technological capacities are
evidence that limits must be established, if the commitment to preserve
human life is not to become an idolatry of technology.) The challenge is
cultural: prudently to apply the means which modern technology makes
available . If limits cannot be set to the obligation to use expensive lifesaving treatment, then the virtue of helping others save their lives will
become the vice of an idolatrous pursuit of physical life to the neglect of
more important goods.
The failuire to set limits poses two genre of problems. The first is moral.
The duty to preserve life in technological societies tends to become allconsuming, so much so that it can overwhelm a proper balance with other
duties, including the weightier ones of sustaining the moral well-being of
patients and their families . This has often been described as the
technological imperative, the perceived moral obligation to use all
available technology regardless of costs, even moral costS.4 The second
genre is economic. The technological imperative supports outlays of
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health care resources which involve major costs, but deliver litle in return.
The economic dimension has its own moral implications: waste is wrong,
the more so if other morally worthwhile medical goals lose the resources
needed to achieve them. The difficulty is that many physicians, and much
of the health care profession , have become enamored of interventions that
are high in cost and low in yield to the detriment of interventions that are
low in cost and high in yield. It is much more exciting to talk about
intensive care than about well-baby care and anti-smoking campaigns.
II. The Tradition's Answer

The Catholic Church faced this set of problems for the first time 400
years ago . Though from our perspective the 16th and 17th centuries may
not appear to have been a period of scientific advance and medical
possibility, it was experienced as an era of major change and dramatic
promise. It was in the 16th century, for example, with the publication of
Vesalius's De humani corporis Jabrica, that anatomy as we know it
emerged. s Progress was such that Descartes could hope that medicine
would allow him to live past the age of 100.6 However, many of the
therapeutic approaches of the time were costly, not only in monetary
terms, but in surgery without the benefit of anesthesia, not to mention
bleeding, blistering, clystering, purging, and leeching. The question
naturally arose as to whether there are limits to the obligation to accept
such treatment, even if it offers the possibility of restoring health.
Catholic theologians of the time answered by distinguishing between
obligatory and non-obligatory treatment, that is, between treatment
involving ordinary means versus extraordinary means . The view was that
the duty to preserve life must be limited by those circumstances which
would render the virtue of preserving life into the vice of doing so at all
costs , thus endangering the moral life of the patient and others.
Extraordinary means are those which are disproportionate and , therefore,
potentially immoderate. The rationale for the distinction is one of properly
ordering the demands of competing obligations: that of preserving life
vis-a-vis those of realizing other goods - societal, familial , intellectual,
aesthetic, moral, religious , even athletic - that contribute to a full
flourishing of life. Accordingly, one may licitly forebear from means to
preserve life not only when the means are futile , but also when they are
intemperate.
The language here is not of rights, i.e. , claims to the means to preserve
life. Rather, the focus is upon the virtues , and more precisely, upon those
which are required to temper the claims of medicine and to understand
where and how what is usually a virtue, saving lives , can become vicious.
There are other goods, e.g., the salvation of one's soul, pursuit of which
should also shape our habits and character. To overstress preserving life is
to neglect the goods which make life valuable, and to forego cultivating the
virtues to realize them. The distinction between ordinary and extraFebruary, 1990

69

ordinary means , therefore, supports those virtues which are required to
limit the claims of medicine.
This can be seen in the considerations considered in the distinction. The
first is whether the treatment is customary. One is obligated to preserve life
and health only with means commonly used in the circumstances common nutrition, common medicines, common medical procedures. 7
Such is the case because, if the obligation to preserve life and health
extended to uncommon means, e.g., unusual nutrition, medicines,
procedures, one would overexaggerate the importance of preserving
physical life. "[T]he good of this life is not held to be of so great an import,"
J oannes de Lugo (d . 1546) observes , "that its preservation must be effected
by extraordinary diligence: it is one thing not to neglect it and throw it
away rashly, to which a man is bound; it is another thing indeed to seek
after it and to hold it back by hard-to-obtain [exquisitis] means as it is
escaping from him, to which he is not held."8The attempt to save one's life
in this world at all costs tends to exclude the pursuit of other goods, e.g.,
saving one's immortal soul; it would therefore tend to distract from the
exercise of the virtues ordained to achieve these goods. One is not 0 bliged
to save one's own life, or that of others, if to try to do so will be seriously
disorienting morally.
The second consideration is burden. One is not obligated to employ
usual means if the burden of their use is too great. The notion of the
extraordinary was thus expanded beyond the concept of the unusual to
incorporate the concept of an undue inconvenience. Excessive burdens are
recognized as either financial, involving excessive costs (sumptus
extraordinarius) or expensive means (media pretiosa), or involving major
effort or indignity (summus labor, nimis dura), or physical (quodam
cruciatus, ingens dolor) or psychological (vehemens horror) suffering. 9
Moreover, they can be either relative to the circumstances of the individual
(secundum proportionem status), or absolute. For a poor individual,
relatively modest costs might impose an extraordinary burden. But there is
such a thing as a cost which constitutes an extraordinary burden in its own
terms, or absolutely, and this is not obligatory even if one can affrord it. IO
The third consideration is likelihood of success. One is only obligated to
use life-saving interventions. If they provide a spes salutis, a reasonable
expectation of life and health. I I We shall explore this issue shortly by
examining a recently devised clinimetric l2 , the APACHE scores, which
provide some basis for determining the likelihood or expectation of
recovery. However, the moral principle upon which practical applications
rest has had traditional acceptance. 13 Spes salutis covers not only the
probability of success, but also the quality and the length of the life which
success conserves. Quality of life and length of life, then, are the final two
considerations ingredient in the traditional distinction. There is no
obligation to undergo debilitating surgery and ! or amputation. 14 Nor is
there an obligation to undergo treatment which simply delays the end of a
fatal course of events. 15
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In summary, the traditional distinction obliges one only to use means to
preserve life and health which are usual in the circumstances, and to use
them only if they both provide a reasonable expectation of health and do
so with burdens not too great. The point is not just that one is excused from
using extraordinary means, but that extraordinary means pose moral
hazards. As Pius XII put it in his 1957 address on the limits of 0 bligations
to provide treatment:
one is normally held to use only ordinary means according to the circumstances
of persons, places, times, and culture, that is to say, means that do not involve any
extraordinary burden for oneself or another. A more strict obligation would be
too heavy for most men and would render the attainment of the higher, more
important good too difficult. Life, health, all temporal activities are in fact
subordinated to spiritual ends. 16

The traditional notion that one is only obligated to use ordinary means to
preserve life permits one to appreciate that the good of living is not an
absolute moral good, but one of a number of intrinsic goods, the pursuit of
anyone of which must be balanced against the pursuit of others. FOLPius
XII, it should be noted, this notion served not only to limit the obligation
to accept treatment, but also to provide it. 17 If we make the preservation of
life an overriding good, we turn the virtue of pursuing life into something
VICIOUS.

Gerald Kelly distinguishes betwen two morally correct standards for
providing health care: "the strict, or extreme, professional standard", and
the "moderate standard." 18 In following the former, the physician,
although recognizing the right of the patient or his proxy to refuse
extraordinary means to conserve his life, yet "insofar as the judgment is left
to himself, ... simply keep[s] trying to prolong life right to the end ." In
contrast, when following the moderate standard, "doctors try to effect a
cure as long as there is any reasonable hope of doing so", but they "also
think there is a point when such efforts become futile [and] ... the sole duty
of the doctor is to see that the patient gets good nursing care and that his
pain is alleviated." The moderate standard "is less likely to impose
excessive burdens on the patient's relatives, who "often endure terrific
strain and undergo great expense while life is being prolonged by artificial
means ."19 However, Kelly's remarks are confined to "paying patients."2o
Consequently, Kelly fails to realize that, for a health care policy in which
technology offers increasingly expensive options, and one in which the
expenditures of third-party payers generate an ever increasing societal
burden, the moderate standard is not simply one licit alternative.2l Rather,
it is the only licit one, because of the obligation to avoid unrestricted
expenditures which seriously burden third parties.22
III. The Contemporary Importance of Traditions' Answer

An appropriate appreciation of the non-absolute value of human
physical life will not be derived from cost-effectiveness studies. Such
February, 1990
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studies demonstrate only the cheapest way to achieve what one already
wants , viz. , to save lives. But they do not address the moral question of
when one should preserve life and at what cost. Such studies cannot ask
what the good of preserving life is in relation to other goods, such as
attaining eternal salvation, or realizing intellectual, aesthetic, or other
values. In contrast, the distinction between ordinary and extraordinary
provides the needed moral framework: indeed , it permits one to see that
the duty to preserve life is not unconditional, that the good of living must
not overshadow the good(s) that give life purpose and worth. the
framework is also economically appropriate: it forces one to defend the
relation between the burden of means (i.e., the economic and psychosocial
costs) and the prospects of cure.
The absence of a temperate moral perspective is exemplified by the
difficulties experienced in limiting treatment in adult ICUs. An 1984 OT A
report on ICUs observed that
it is now recognized that a significant number of deaths in the leu occur after 'no
resuscitation' orders have been written. In two large medical centers, as many as
40 to 70 percent of leu deaths occurred under these circumstances. In a large
community hospita l, 19 percent of leu non-survivors had no hope of reco very
a nd were in the leu solely for terminal care. In short. a substantial portion of
leu care for nonsurvivors occurs after hope of recovery had been abandoned 23

The failure to use ICUs in a prudent fashion has implications for health
care as a whole , because ICUs account for a significant part of the health
care budget, 15-20% of all hospital expenditures in the U .S. 24, around
1/ 2% of the entire G.N.P. of the U.S . If, as the OTA indicates , many
patients are in ICUs even though they have no reasonable expectation of
recovery, their treatment in ICUs reflects an inability to set appropriate
limits to the use of technology to conserve life.
The ability to set limits can be enhanced by jUdging the likelihood of
success (the spes salutis). With increasing accuracy, one can now
determine correlations between physiological findings prior to and upon
admission to an ICU and the likelihood of the patient's benefitting from
treatment, i.e., surviving. The APACHE score (an acronym for Acute
Psychology and Chronic Health Evaluation) first published in 1981 , and
revised as APACHE II in 1985 , offers a means of enabling such
prognostication.25 By assigning patients points on the bases of 12 routine
psychological measurements (made within 24 hours of admission), of age,
and of chronic health problems, statistically predictive correlations can be
made between patients' scores and their chances of survival. As a result of
this and similar studies,26 one can now begin to determine in advance the
circumstances under which the use of ICUs is likely to be effective. For
example, intensive care does not offer a substantial chance of survival for
people with high AP ACHE scores; indeed , for individuals with scores over
40, the chances of survival asymptomatically approach zero. One the other
hand, patients with APACHE scores of 10 or less may do as well in a
non-ICU setting, at least in a step-down unit. 27
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The difficulty in using such scores is that one will be wrong at times,
albeit infrequently. But if the right to life were absolute, it would be
unacceptable to be wrong even I % of the time. One would be obligated to
admit on a first-come , first-served basis, and not to sacrifice on the altar of
excessive burden the possibility of saving a life. However, if considerations
of costs and likelihood of survival are of moral weight, the answers will be
quite different. 28 If the average treatment cost of those who would survive
is $10,000 , then the cost of a life saved will be $1,000 ,000 (i.e. , on the basis
of a I % chance of survival and an average cost of $10,000 per case
treated).29 Such a cost may quite correctly appear excessive. Though much
work still remains to be done in improving the predictive accuracy of
clinimetrics such as APACHE, their successors are likely to provide us
with the data which can guide health care policy if we have the proper
moral perspective.
The traditional Catholic distinction offers a moral framework for
limiting the use of ICU s for patients with high AP ACHE scores, or with
low scores, as well as for asking when the quality of life preserved in the
case of patients is unlikely to justify the costs of treatment in intensive care
units . The moral understanding that one is obliged only to use ordinary
means which constitute a non-excessive burden and offer a reasonable
likelihood of a healthy life, unlike a utilitarian calculus, places the
preservation of human life in a contextual relation with per se goods such
as eternal salvation. It thus allows an appreciation of why the good of
merely living is not always morally overriding. The notion that
extraordinary means cannot be obligatory, shows why creating practices
that make the good of preserving life overriding, transforms the virtue of
preserving life into the vice. Though the distinction between ordinary and
extraordinary care was first applied to health care 400 years ago, its most
morally important use may be in this century, and the nexPo
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